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In this article we offer a two-part commentary on Bolton and Gillett’s 
reconceptualization of Engel’s biopsychosocial model. In the first 
section we present a conceptual and historical assessment of the 
biopsychosocial model that differs from the analysis by Bolton and 
Gillett. Specifically, we point out that Engel in his vision of the 
biopsychosocial model was less concerned with the ontological 
possibility and nature of psychosocial causes, and more concerned 
with psychosocial influences in the form of illness interpretation and 
presentation, sick role, seeking or rejection of care, the doctor-patient 
therapeutic relationship, and role of personality factors and family 
relationships in recovery from illness, etc. On the basis of this 
assessment, we then question Bolton and Gillett’s restricted focus on 
accounting for biopsychosocial causal interactions. The second 
section compares Bolton and Gillett’s account with a recent 
enactivist account of mental disorder that tackles similar conceptual 
problems of causal interactions. Bolton and Gillett’s utilize elements 
of the 4E cognition, but they combine these proto-ideas with an 
information-processing paradigm. Given their explicit endorsement 
of 4E approaches to mind and cognition, we illustrate some key ways 
in which a more fleshed out enactive account, particularly one that 
doesn’t rely on notions of information-processing, differs from the 
account proposed by Bolton and Gillett. 
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“The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease: New Philosophical 
and Scientific Developments” by Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett (2019) is 
among the most intellectually stimulating books that have been published 
in the area of philosophy of medicine and philosophy of psychiatry in 
recent years. It makes notable and substantial contributions to the literature 
on the biopsychosocial model as well as the nature of causal interactions. 
It is therefore with pleasure and admiration that we offer this critical 
commentary. 
 
Our commentary is divided in two sections. In the first section we present 
a conceptual and historical assessment of the biopsychosocial model 
(BPSM) that differs from the analysis by Bolton and Gillett (B&G). 
Specifically, we point out that Engel’s BPSM was concerned with much 
more than the ontological possibility of psychological and social causes. 
On the basis of this assessment, we then question B&G’s restricted focus 
on accounting for biopsychosocial causal interactions, and in doing so we 
identify important aspects of debate about the BPSM that we think B&G 
have overlooked. The second section compares B&G’s account with a 
recent enactivist account of mental disorder that tackles similar conceptual 
problems. There are aspects of B&G’s work that strike us as being 
somewhat “proto-enactive”, although they attempt to combine these ideas 
with an information-processing paradigm. Given B&G’s explicit 
endorsement of 4E approaches to mind and cognition (Bolton and Gillett 
2019, 76), we think it worthwhile to consider the ways in which a fleshed 
out enactive account differs from the account proposed by B&G.  
 
 
1. There is More to Engel’s BPSM than Causal Interactions 
 
B&G’s fundamental focus is on causal interactions in the biopsychosocial 
realm. They write:  
 
The conceptual challenge, recognised by Engel and 
contemporary commentary, is that there are historically deeply 
entrenched assumptions—physicalism, dualism and reductionism—
to the effect that only material, physical and chemical causes 
are real, while distinctive psychological causes and social 
causes are impossible or incomprehensible. (Bolton and Gillett 
2019, vi)  
 
As such, the majority of their text is focused on developing an account of 
biopsychosocial causal interactions, the ontological space in which these 
interactions take place, and how the psychological and social can have 
genuine causal power within this framework. B&G see their account as a 
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general model, with the purpose of theorizing biopsychosocial interactions 
in health and disease. In their words:  
 
We focus here on the general biopsychosocial model as a core 
philosophical and scientific theory of health, disease and 
healthcare, which defines the foundational theoretical 
constructs—the ontology of the biological, the psychological 
and the social—and especially the causal relations within and 
between these domains. (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 19) 
 
B&G are correct that there are historically entrenched assumptions relating 
to physicalism, dualism, and reductionism that have dominated scientific 
and medical thinking, and they are also correct that this was recognized by 
Engel. However, we believe that B&G misdiagnose the negative 
consequences of these assumptions with which Engel was concerned and 
which he sought to address in his BPSM. Engel’s fundamental concern was 
not in establishing the reality and existence of psychosocial causes, but 
rather in the establishing that the psychosocial realm is worthy of scientific 
exploration and that there is no reason to exclude it from the realm of 
scientific medical inquiry. Engel was not primarily interested in the alleged 
impossibility or incomprehensibility of psychological and social causes. 
We believe this is a fundamental point that has gone by unappreciated not 
only by B&G, but also in general by commentators following Engel.  
 
That Engel was not primarily concerned with causal interactions is 
apparent in Engel’s seminal papers on BPSM, but becomes even more so 
when his other writings are considered. In Engel’s classic 1977 paper on 
the subject, Engel is, for a large portion of the article, concerned with the 
concept of disease and whether our notion of disease should be restricted 
to biochemical abnormalities. He writes,  
 
Medicine’s crisis stems from the logical inference that since 
“disease” is defined in terms of somatic parameters, physicians 
need not be concerned with psychosocial issues which lie 
outside medicine’s responsibility and authority. (Engel 1977)  
 
This statement of medicine’s crisis does not indicate a fundamental 
concern with causal interactions, but rather the nature of our notions of 
health and disease, and their subsequent implications. 
 
Engel’s concerns with the biomedical way of thinking are further expanded 
on in other articles. In his (1997) article “From Biomedical to 
Biopsychosocial”, Engel sees the aim of the biopsychosocial medicine as 
being scientific in the human domain: 
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Biopsychosocial thinking aims to provide a conceptual 
framework suitable for developing a scientific approach to 
what patients have to tell us about their illness experiences (…). 
Biomedical education’s a priori assumption that such patient-
derived data and the means of their acquisition are neither 
teachable, nor subject to systematic study, needs to be 
examined. (Engel 1997) 
 
Below are some quotations from his (1992) article, “How Much Longer 
Must Medicine’s Science Be Bound by a Seventeenth Century World 
View?” (Engel 1992) 
 
In any consideration of a scientific model for medicine that 
would qualify as a successor to the biomedical model, be it the 
biopsychosocial or any other, the fundamental issue is whether 
physicians can in their study and care of patients be scientists 
and work scientifically in the human domain. Or is medicine’s 
human domain beyond the reach of science and the scientific 
method, an art, as the biomedical model in effect requires? 
 
Medicine’s adherence to a seventeenth century paradigm 
predicated on the mechanism, reductionism, determinism, and 
dualism of Newton and Descartes automatically excludes what 
is distinctively human from the realm of science and the 
scientific. 
 
Biomedicine’s rejection of dialogue as a genuinely scientific 
means of data collection is evident in the neglect of instruction 
and supervision in interviewing, not to mention in clinical data 
collection altogether, and in the preference for the case 
presentation as a method of clinical teaching, one in which 
students may display their ability to organize and discuss 
findings, but not reveal the methods and skills whereby they 
had come by the data in the first place, least of all their 
interpersonal engagement with the patient. 
 
This is recognized, to an extent, even by B&G, because they begin chapter 
1 by listing what Engel identified as limitations of the biomedical model, 
that it fails to take into account the following:  
 
the person who has the illness, the person’s experience of, 
account of and attitude towards the illness; whether the person 
or others in fact regard the condition as an illness; care of the 
patient as a person; for some conditions such as schizophrenia 
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and diabetes, the effect of conditions of living on onset, 
presentation and course; and finally, the healthcare system 
itself also cannot be conceptualised solely in biomedical terms 
but rather involves social factors such as professionalization. 
(Bolton and Gillett 2019, 2) 
 
Notably, concerns about the causal reality of psychosocial factors do not 
appear on this list by Engel, because such concerns are prominently 
missing from Engel’s seminal writings. Given Engel’s strong interest in 
the various dimensions of the illness experience and utilizing the clinical 
interview as an instrument of scientific inquiry, it is quite possible that 
Engel would have been dismayed to see interpretations of BPSM as having 
to do primarily with causal interactions. 
 
It needs to be stated that the responsibility for this misunderstanding of 
Engel’s thesis doesn’t lie with B&G. Such a characterization of BPSM as 
being concerned primarily with causes is widespread, even among the 
most ardent champions of BPSM. Consider, for instance, Dr Ronald Pies, 
author of Clinical Manual of Psychiatric Diagnosis and Treatment: A 
Biopsychosocial Approach (Pies 1994), who wrote in Psychiatric Times in 
2020: The biopsychosocial paradigm  
 
asserts that most (but not necessarily all) serious mental 
disorders are best understood as having a variety of causes and 
risk factors––including but not necessarily limited to 
biological, psychological and social components. (Pies 2020) 
 
While such a formulation is not strictly erroneous, it is a more restrictive 
understanding of Engel’s vision (Aftab 2020). The matters that preoccupy 
Engel are more to do with psychosocial influences in the form of illness 
interpretation and presentation, sick role, seeking or rejection of care, the 
doctor-patient therapeutic relationship, and role of personality factors and 
family relationships in recovery from illness, etc. Engel was seeking a 
framework that would bring the psychosocial and phenomenological 
dimensions of illness within the realm of medical and scientific inquiry. 
Causes and risk factors are included in it, surely, but they are not 
particularly privileged by Engel. 
 
Why then has our popular understanding of BPSM been so focused on 
causal risk factors and causal interactions? This appears to be a 
consequence of the manner in which BPSM has been operationalized and 
taught to medical trainees. The operationalization has taken the form of a 
biopsychosocial formulation. This formulation is illustrated as a table in 
which there are three columns of “biological”, “psychological” and 
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“social”, and four rows of predisposing factors, precipitating factors, 
perpetuating factors, and protective factors (see Huda 2020 for an example 
of such a formulation). This organization urges the trainees to take into 
account all the various causal factors by filling in all the boxes. 
Furthermore, such a formulation is intended to assist in the development 
of a treatment plan, with the understanding that the treatment should be 
aimed at all the modifiable causal factors identified.  
  
The biopsychosocial formulation, while a useful educational and clinical 
tool, creates a number of conceptual and philosophical problems 
(Waterman 2006). First of all, it encourages the reification of “biological”, 
“psychological” and “social” as separate and distinct ontological domains. 
Such a reification is illusory, since there are good reasons to think that the 
biological, the psychological, and the social as levels of explanation are 
best understood as heuristic idealizations that are helpful in making certain 
sorts of distinctions of interest to us, but do not reflect deep ontological 
features of the world (see Eronen 2021 for a defense of this view). 
Secondly, causal factors identified have to be cleanly sorted into one or the 
other column, often in an arbitrary or artificial manner (e.g., is “pain” a 
biological or a psychological factor?). Thirdly, while all the risk factors are 
categorized, no weight is assigned regarding their respective causal roles, 
giving the (false) impression that they “are all, more or less equally, 
relevant”. Fourthly, since a combination of bio-psycho-social factors will 
almost always be present, a clinician may feel justified in offering any sort 
of treatment that is perceived to address those factors, regardless of 
whether that treatment is backed by scientific evidence or is recommended 
by guidelines. Fifthly, creating a static array of causal risk factors further 
enhances the mystery of how these causal factors interact dynamically in 
the real world.  
 
It is in the face of such an understanding of BPSM that Paul McHugh and 
Philip Slavney (1998) argue that the model is amorphous and vague, 
offering little meaningful guidance for clinical and research work. They 
see BPSM as analogous to a list of ingredients rather than a recipe, 
providing no instructions on how these ingredients are to be effectively 
mixed together in the process of cooking. 
 
It is also important to understand the ideological function that BPSM has 
served in psychiatry. BPSM was utilized as a means of bridging the rift 
between the various factions within psychiatry with biological, 
psychological, and social orientations (Ghaemi 2010). It did so by a sort of 
Dodo bird verdict that all approaches are legitimate, and none shall be 
excluded, “everyone has won, and all must have prizes”. It is this rhetorical 
function of BPSM that leads Ghaemi (2010) to contend that in 
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contemporary practice BPSM has led the clinicians into a state of lazy 
eclecticism. 
 
While B&G allude to some of this, and recognize that the attitude of 
uncritical eclecticism is not present in Engel’s original writings, they fall 
short in two ways: i) they don’t recognize, at least explicitly, that a central 
preoccupation with causal interactions is also not present in Engel’s 
writings, and ii) they don’t seem to demonstrate an adequate appreciation 
that many criticisms of BPSM are directed at the manner in which BPSM 
has been operationalized and implemented. Given this targeting, such 
criticisms will stand as long as the practical implementation of BPSM 
remains the same.  
 
While B&G highlight the criticisms of BPSM by Ghaemi and Kendler, 
they don’t seem to make much effort at engaging with the conceptual 
alternatives offered by these authors. Both Ghaemi and Kendler endorse 
versions of “pluralism” as replacements for BPSM, Jasperian 
methodological pluralism in the case of Ghaemi (2010), and explanatory 
integrative pluralism in the case of Kendler (2005). The basic viewpoint of 
such pluralisms is that multiple independent methods and explanations (at 
multiple levels/scales) are necessary to understand and treat mental 
illnesses. The strengths and limits of each method or explanation need to 
be recognized, and that method/explanation should be utilized which is 
best suited for the specific circumstances based on pragmatic constraints, 
relevant epistemic values, and empirical evidence. 
  
There is somewhat of a parallel here to B&G’s assertion that the content 
of the BPSM is in the specifics. It can be argued that saying that the content 
of BPSM lies in the scientific and clinical specifics is not that much 
different from saying that our understanding of specific conditions and 
disorders should be guided by the best available scientific explanations for 
those disorders, explanations which will almost always include 
psychosocial variables in addition to biological variables, either as 
contributing to etiology, presentation, course, or treatment considerations. 
The value that BPSM offers in this regard is basically as a reminder: do 
not restrict your notions of scientific inquiry to exclude the human and the 
psychosocial realm. Aside from serving as a reminder, it does not seem to 
offer anything above and beyond what we would expect a good scientific 
explanation to offer. In other words, a good scientific explanation of a 
complex, multifactorial medical condition such as diabetes or depression 
will invariably be one that includes biological, psychological, and social 
variables, but that is not because the good scientific explanation will be 
derived from BPSM.    
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In a similar vein, the value of BPSM in clinical practice and medical 
education is that of a reminder not to ignore psychosocial variables. Such 
a reminder is necessary because of medicine’s long-trenched history of 
focusing on the biological to the exclusion of the psychosocial. As noted 
by Kendler:  
 
[BPSM] is used widely in family medicine and is a great 
teaching tool, reminding the residents to consider the 
psychological and social influences on their cases and not just 
focusing on the pathophysiology. (Kendler 2010) 
 
A philosophical account of bio-psycho-social causal interactions doesn’t 
quite serve the same purpose. This also indicates that when it comes to 
BPSM as it currently exists, calling it a “model” is beyond charitable 
(McLaren 1998). It is more of an attitude, a mantra, a meditation, a nudge, 
an aide-memoire, rather than anything as elaborate as a “model”, and 
assuming that it is indeed a model creates all sorts of conceptual problems.  
B&G’s philosophical account of biopsychosocial causal interactions is a 
worthwhile philosophical inquiry, but in light of Engel’s original writings, 
there is no good reason that BPSM should concern itself solely with causal 
interactions, to the exclusion of issues that were of concern to Engel: the 
human domain with all its quirks and colors. Even if a successful account 
of biopsychosocial interactions were to be provided, it does little to address 
the conceptual and scientific issues in contemporary practice of, in the 
words of Kendler, “how to integrate the diverse etiologic factors that 
contribute to psychiatric illness and how to conceptualize rigorously 
multidimensional approaches to treatment” (Kendler 2010). Establishing 
the psychological and the social as ontologically and causally real doesn’t 
help us with the question of how to best integrate the etiological factors in 
the form of a coherent explanation and how this should inform 
multidimensional approaches to treatment. 
 
In summary of section 1: 
 
• An interpretation of BPSM with a central emphasis to causal 
interactions is at odds with Engel’s vision of BPSM which 
was focused more on bringing the human domain into the 
scientific realm, establishing clinical interview as a 
scientific instrument, taking illness experience seriously as 
scientific data, and adopting a non-reductionistic view of 
disease and health. 
 
• Many popular criticisms of BPSM are targeted at how BPSM 
has been operationalized and implemented for the purposes 
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of clinical education, and the way the rhetoric of BPSM has 
been used for ideological purposes. Reinterpreting BPSM as 
a philosophical account of biopsychosocial causal 
interactions will not, by itself, address these concerns.  
 
• The assertion that the content of the BPSM is in the specifics 
does not seem to offer anything above and beyond what we 
would expect a good scientific explanation to offer. In other 
words, a good scientific explanation of a complex, 
multifactorial medical condition such as diabetes or 
depression will invariably be one that includes biological, 
psychological, and social variables, but that is not because 
the good scientific explanation will be derived from BPSM.  
   
• Given the historical dominance of the reductionistic 
scientific worldview, BPSM appears to serve as a reminder 
to avoid the reductionistic trappings of the biomedical 
mindset; its clinical and educational value appears to be as 
a mantra, a nudge, an aide-memoire, rather than anything 
as elaborate as a “model”, and assuming that it is indeed a 
model creates all sorts of conceptual problems. 
 
• Establishing the psychological and the social as 
ontologically and causally real doesn’t help us with the 
question of how to best integrate the etiological factors in 
the form of a coherent explanation and how this should 
inform multidimensional approaches to treatment. 
 
• B&G do not seem to pay attention to the alternatives to 
BPSM that have emerged in the last 2 decades in the 
philosophical literature, such as various forms of 
explanatory and methodological pluralisms.  
 
 
2. Comparison with an Embodied Enactive View 
 
As conceptual pluralists, we see value in there being a variety of ways to 
view something as complex as health and well-being. However, these 
different views must be allowed to ‘bounce off’ each other––to be 
compared in terms of strengths and weaknesses and refined in response. It 
is through diversity and dialogue that better frameworks will emerge. In 
this section we compare B&G’s BPSM to one such developing alternative, 
the embodied, embedded, and enactive view of psychopathology (3EP) 
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(Nielsen 2020, 2021; Nielsen and Ward 2018, 2020). As we have 
mentioned earlier, B&G cite the 4E framework as inspiration for their own 
view of embodied agency, but there are substantial differences between 
their model and models of health and disease that have emerged from, 
identify with, and operate within the 4E tradition.  
 
Very briefly, 3EP is an approach to conceptualizing mental disorder 
grounded in a view of human functioning as embodied (fully material, and 
constituted by not just the brain, but the brain-body system), embedded 
(richly and bi-directionally connected to the world around us), and enactive 
(meaning is not out there in the world, nor is it ‘constructed’ by us, but 
rather concerns the very real relation between the state of the world and 
our purpose to try to keep living). While being a ‘biological’ position that 
acknowledges the importance of physiological processes for understanding 
behavior, 3EP places equal value on personal meaning and interpersonal 
scales of explanation. In this way it is a non-reductionistic position, yet 
does not ignore the importance of the body and its biological constitution. 
3EP thus sees all the various scales of explanation relevant to 
understanding human behavior as different perspectival aspects of the 
same dynamic whole – an organism standing in relation to its environment 
(both physical and socio-cultural). On this view mental disorders appear as 
patterns existing across brain, body, and environment, keeping people 
stuck in patterns of behavior that are working against their own adaption 
and self-maintenance. To conserve space this summary has been extremely 
brief. For fuller accounts see: Nielsen (2020, 2021), Nielsen and Ward 
(2018, 2020). For a complimentary perspective on mental disorder referred 
to as Enactive Psychiatry see: de Haan (2020a, 2020b, 2020c). 
 
While the BPS is a general framework of health and 3EP is a developing 
conceptual perspective specifically focused on mental disorder, both 
positions overlap in important ways. Both positions seek to move beyond 
purely biomedical understandings and recognize the legitimacy of socio-
cultural and environmental impacts on health. Further, both do so by 
claiming to place biological, psychological, social, and environmental 
factors into a single ontological space, thus accounting for increasingly 
recognized interactions between these ‘domains’. Both positions engage 
with notions of formal/organizational causality as seen through their 
shared talk of ‘systems’ and ‘dynamics’. Finally, both positions seem to 
see such organizational causality as a way to account for the emergence of 
apparent purposes/teleology, against which they can meaningfully speak 
of function/dysfunction. There are however, important differences in how 
these tasks are achieved. Here we will explore two of these differences, 
and use the discussion to highlight areas where the current construal of 
Bolton and Gillett’s BPS leaves us wanting to know more. 
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2.1. The Role of ‘Information’ 
 
Following Engel, Bolton and Gillett’s BPS framework views the world in 
terms of relatively distinct (but not ontologically separate) domains of the 
biological, the psychological, and the socio-political. This then presents 
them with somewhat of a ‘re-stitching’ problem, and they subsequently 
account for relationships between these domains using the key notions of 
information transfer and regulatory control. At the risk of over-
summarizing this view: Biological processes receive information/instructions 
from DNA and, through following these instructions, regulate their own 
physico-chemical constitution and immediate environments. Psychological 
processes meanwhile (embodied in the nervous system) receive and 
integrate information about the state of the self and the world via sensory 
input, and attempt to regulate the world and self in a way that meets the 
organism’s needs through embodied agency. Finally, socio-political 
processes (embodied in the actions of the collective) involve the perception 
and recognition of others (a complex form of information transfer), and the 
regulatory control of resources needed by individuals.  
 
An important question at this point however is ‘what exactly is 
information?’. The notion of information in biological systems has 
generated considerable philosophical debate, and these debates are of great 
relevance to B&G given the central role information plays in their account. 
Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny’s (2007) entry on “Biological Information” in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a great resource for this purpose, 
and we’ll summarize some pertinent remarks here. An uncontroversial and 
minimal notion of information is that of Shannon information, according 
to which any variable may be said to ‘contain/carry/be’ information about 
a source if it correlates with the state of that source. On this account 
information is said to be present in the variable in that the variable can be 
used to predict the state of the distal source. There is no greater 
commitment in Shannon information that there is any biological system 
designed/intended to produce that signal or to use it once produced. 
Biologists, however, often appear to use a notion of information that is 
richer than Shannon information and much more controversial, i.e. 
information with semantic and intentional content. Godfrey-Smith and 
Sterelny (2016) present readers with three options with regards to the 
concept of semantic information in biology:  
 
1. Semantic information is useful as an analogy, as a 
metaphor, but not intended to be literally true. 
 
2. Semantic information literally exists in biological systems, 
in which case the task of the philosopher is to explain how 
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semantic information can arise and exist in non-intelligent 
systems. 
 
3. Shannon information is sufficient for biological systems 
and no richer concept is needed.  
 
We don’t intend to settle this debate here or defend a particular approach, 
but we want to point out that the philosophical validity of any particular 
view is far from obvious. It would appear that B&G would adopt the 
second view, that semantic information literally exists, but it is unclear 
how they would defend it. B&G do, however, demonstrate clear awareness 
of the contextuality of information. For example, when discussing 
genetics/DNA they stress that  
 
genes code for particular proteins (…) [where] ‘code for’ 
means: in normal circumstances, in the normal cellular 
environment, in a complex series of interlocking steps, such-
and-such DNA sequence produces such-and-such protein.  
(Bolton and Gillett 2019, 54) 
 
In making such specifications they acknowledge awareness that 
information is always contextual––e.g., language is gibberish to those of a 
completely different social-cultural context. Ultimately information is 
merely a flow of change within a system, change that is then used by the 
system in some way. This would suggest that their view is also compatible 
with understanding semantic information as analogy, an epistemological 
tool utilized by observers––a way that we can make (our own) sense of the 
system/s understudy. As such, information-processing is a model or 
metaphor, representing one possible way to understand a system. Either 
way, there is little philosophical clarity on this point.  
 
No such information processing metaphor is employed under the 3EP 
view. Under 3EP there is no tripartite structure to the ontology. Instead, 
the brain, body, and environment are considered to all be constituted from 
material substance, and to form a complex dynamical system existing 
across different scales of time and space––i.e., the so-called ‘brain-body-
environment system’. Rather than traditional levels of ontology such as the 
genetic, cellular, organistic, organismic, behavioral, or social, 3EP 
recognizes such divisions as simply referring to increasing constitutional 
complexity across increasing scales of time and space, with the emergence 
of some organizationally closed systems along the way (Di Paolo et al. 
2018; Maiese 2016; Thompson 2007; Varela et al. 2017; Potochnik 2010). 
Because of this there is no mysterious interaction between domains or 
levels to be explained by information exchange. Thus, instead of the 
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language of ‘information’ and ‘regulatory control’ seen in the BPS, 3EP 
utilizes the language of organizational or circular causality (Fuchs 2017), 
speaking of concepts such as emergence, constraint, and constitution, 
when navigating multi-scale interactions.  
 
A question that may arise at this point is, what then is the psychological in 
such a materialist (but dynamical) worldview? In short, under the enactive 
approach the biological and psychological are seen as continuous. The 
psychological is something that is enacted through the organization and 
action of the biological organism (Thompson 2007). To put it another way, 
the enactive approach avoids substance dualism by holding ‘the mind’ to 
be a verb, not a noun. This relates to a key concept of the enactive approach 
known as the ‘deep continuity thesis’, which we will return to in the next 
section. On this view the organizational structures of life are the structures 
of mind and the psychological is therefore thoroughly embodied.  
 
As one way of attempting to understand the dynamic constitution of a 
human being standing in their environment, the model of information 
processing may well be a helpful one. In essence it represents somewhat 
of a cognitive/epistemological short-cut via metaphor to communications 
equipment or computers. However, B&G reference the idea of an 
embodied, embedded, and enactive mind as inspiration for their 
framework, and these ideas apparently play a core role in their concept of 
embodied agency (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 76). Given that these schools 
of thought commonly avoid talk of information, and arguably successfully 
navigate similar conceptual issues to the BPS without reliance on an 
information-processing metaphor, the necessity of B&G’s reliance on an 
information processing approach is not entirely clear. 
 
2.2. The Emergence of Normativity/Functionality 
 
One of the biggest challenges for naturalist approaches to conceptualizing 
health is that health is a fundamentally normative idea, and the natural is 
traditionally seen in opposition to the normative. In order to say that some 
state of the world is naturally preferable to another (e.g., not having cancer 
vs. having cancer) we need to be able to traverse the ‘normative gap’ 
between what is (i.e., the factual state of a person) and what we are 
claiming ought to be (i.e., a state of health). B&G’s biopsychosocial 
framework claims to have crossed this divide. For example, they claim that 
“(…) the theory is fundamentally normative (…)” (Bolton and Gillett 
2019, 35). However, as far as we can tell they do not directly and explicitly 
address how they see themselves as having crossed it. Within the biological 
domain they appear to attempt to do so using the notion of information and 
error. As they move into the psychological and socio-political domains 
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they appear to shift to a reliance on a systems-based notion of functionality 
and preservation of the system. In this section we compare B&G’s 
approach to the 3EP approach which is more thoroughly systems-based 
and currently more specified. We argue that this systems-based 
understanding is preferable, and that the BPS could be improved by 
explicitly and more thoroughly assuming such a systems-based approach.  
 
In chapter 2 while discussing the biological domain, B&G state that  
 
(…) regulation and control mechanisms keep things going 
right rather than wrong. Such normativity is not apparent in 
the energy equations of physics and chemistry, which always 
apply and never fail. It arises in biology for the first time, 
marking a fundamental departure of biology from physical and 
chemical processes alone. (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 50)  
 
They also seem to imply that this normativity has to do with information 
and how it can contain errors or be misread  
 
 (…) the information-processing paradigm in biology secures 
the fundamental point that the functional end of a system (…) 
is (…) already present in the system prior to production, as 
instructions and a mechanism for the production. (Bolton and 
Gillett 2019, 54)  
 
It is therefore through the fact that we can see ‘instructions’ in 
biology/DNA that B&G claim we can first see normativity arising.   
 
However, B&G also reference a different source of normativity, that of the 
wider functioning of the system. They state that “(…) normativity also 
applies at the level of the whole organism in interaction with the 
environment: interaction is adaptive insofar as it promotes continuity and 
functioning and is otherwise maladaptive” (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 51). 
As B&G shift to discussing the psychological and social domains in 
chapter 3, and the wider notions of health and disease in chapter 4, they 
appear to speak less about information and error as a normative basis, and 
more about perpetuation of the system as a basis for defining functionality. 
For example, in chapter 4, when they come closest to directly addressing 
the source of normativity within the BPS, they are clear that the logic of 
attributing disease is ‘top-down’. They state that “[i]t is poor outcomes at 
the level of the whole that ultimately drives attribution of dysfunctionality 
downwards to the parts that serve the whole” (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 
111). 
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The 3EP perspective has a strength in that it directly addresses this 
normative gap. Nielsen and Ward (2020) explore how the enactive 
concepts of self-maintenance and adaption, grounded in the organizational 
structures of life, lay the groundwork for a view of mental disorder that is 
both natural and normative. In doing so, they also draw on the work of 
non-enactive authors that have developed consilient arguments for the 
natural emergence of normativity such as Okrent (2017) and Christensen 
(2012). They demonstrate how the deep continuity thesis at the heart of 
enactivism is itself an account of natural normativity:  
 
Under the deep continuity thesis, all life shares an embodied 
“concern” (i.e., a self-perpetuating structure) for the 
continuation of the self (…) in the face of changing and 
precarious environmental conditions (…). Insofar as an 
organism should act to maintain its own life, there are states, 
actions, and processes that the organism should be in or 
perform. (Nielsen and Ward 2020, 8) 
 
From these roots, Nielsen and Ward show how a view emerges where 
mental disorder can be seen as a pattern of behavior (including cognition 
and affect), enacted by an organism, that pushes significantly counter to its 
own self-maintenance and adaption in context.  
 
Such a perspective aligns well with a view where organisms are understood 
as systems that maintain a non-equilibrium steady state, temporarily 
pushing back against the 2nd law of thermodynamics. Coming at the same 
idea from this explicitly systemic view, what is functional is what manages 
to serve the survival of the organism at a non-equilibrium steady state 
within a fluctuating environment. A similar systemic notion of 
functionality appears to be inherent (and potentially extended) in recent 
perspectives such as active/enactive inference (Ramstead et al. 2020), or 
the social ecological model of mental functioning (Chapman 2021). As 
mentioned, such a view is alluded to by B&G but is currently somewhat 
underspecified. Given our concerns about the role of information 
expressed in the previous section, we suspect this systemic approach holds 
much greater potential than attempting to ground normativity in the idea 




In summary of section 2: 
 
• B&G explicitly reference ideas of embodiment, embedment, and 
enactivism, and their work shares some overlap in intention with 
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a 3EP approach. Their work seems somewhat ‘proto-enactive’ in 
that these ideas are referenced but do not seem to permeate their 
approach. 
 
• B&G’s notion of ‘information’ is currently underspecified and 
potentially in tension with their supposed grounding in ideas of 
embodiment and enactivism.  
 
• B&G claim to have crossed the ‘normative gap’, a challenge for 
any naturalist account of health and disease, but how they do so is 
unclear.  
 
• At times, B&G seem to reference a systems-based/organizational 
notion of natural normativity. Such an approach has potential, but 
is significantly underspecified in their current account. Such an 
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